During the Cold War, the need of the major Western powers for maritime forces was clear. 1 They were confronted by a superpower adversary which, although primarily continental in outlook, also maintained large submarine, maritime air and surface naval forces capable of threatening the sea communications on which the NATO countries depended. With the demise of the USSR, there is no longer any navy capable of offering a significant challenge to Western use of the oceans; with no plausible opponent, it could be argued, there must be scope for significant reductions in British and American naval forces. For example, one respected American analyst wrote a recent article arguing that the United States should spend less on its navy, on the grounds that:
The threats that carrier battle groups and a large attack submarine fleet were built to confront no longer exist. With the demise of the Soviet navy, there is no significant naval fleet in the world other than the U.S. fleet. Nor could one emerge quickly.
2
In reality, however, the purpose of a navy is not only to fight an opposing navy -that is a means to the end of making use of the sea. In both Second World War and Cold War NATO plans, the defeat of opposing naval, submarine and air forces was required in order to use the sea to transport reinforcements and supplies and to project military power ashore. Moreover, during the Cold War period, although the central focus for both the US Navy and the Royal Navy was the possibility of conflict with the USSR, they saw frequent action in regional conflicts of various sorts, in which their contribution was in projecting power and supporting forces ashore rather than fighting an opposing fleet.
3 The size and shape of the navy needed by a state depends on what it seeks to do at and from the sea, not solely on the threat posed by potentially hostile fleets.
The relevant question about navies after the Cold War is therefore not whether there is an opposing navy they may have to defeat but, rather,
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are there any important roles which they can efficiently fulfil? This issue can be investigated by examining the two major regional conflicts in which the Western powers have been involved since the end of the Cold War -the 1990-91 Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. While some caution is needed in drawing lessons from them, together they form a significant part of the experience on which planning and force structures will be based. It is therefore important to have an accurate account of the roles played in these two conflicts by different sorts of forces; yet while land-based air power has been lauded, the contribution made by maritime power has been generally neglected. The Gulf War tends to be portrayed as having been fought primarily by land-based aircraft, with ground forces completing the victory. On the other hand, Western forceful intervention in the former Yugoslavia is seen as having been initially conducted by ground forces supported by air power, but as succeeding only when air power took the lead; in neither case did naval power play more than a marginal role. In fact, these pictures of the two conflicts are caricatures.
This chapter outlines the role of maritime forces in each of the conflicts. 4 It argues that even though both the Gulf War and the Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia represented difficult tests for maritime power and were by no means unusually favourable for its exercise, in each navies performed a number of vital functions for which other forces could not have substituted.
THE GULF CONFLICT, 1990-91 Accounts of the Gulf conflict tend to give greatest prominence to landbased air power. Several analysts even saw in it the fulfilment of the claims of the interwar air power thinkers. One USAF officer concluded that Douhet 'was right all along.' Indeed: This is the essence of Douhet's concepts: air power so powerful that it alone could defeat an enemy. It happened in Desert Storm. ...Perhaps the key question remaining from Desert Storm is, 'Did we need a ground operation at all?' 5 For Luttwak, Alexander de Seversky was also rehabilitated: 'at least it may be said that after 70 years the old promises of "Victory Through Air Power" were finally redeemed in 1991 in the skies of Iraq'; and 'the final ground offensive of Desert Storm was not offensive at all but rather an almost unopposed advance.' 6 Luttwak concluded that, although it
